

RETURNING TO ARMY LEADERSHIP

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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Great military leaders inspire their troops and lead them into battle. No senior officer in today's Army has risen to this level of greatness. Instead, we are led by a corps of general officers who are better described with superlatives like "scholar", "diplomat", and "manager". This paper examines what has changed in our leadership doctrine, selection process, training and philosophy of leadership that has resulted in this profound change. It makes recommendations regarding how we can return to our heritage and revise our leadership programs to develop the next generation of Generals to lead our Army.

RETURNING TO ARMY LEADERSHIP

General George S. Patton, Jr., still one of the most recognizable military leaders in U.S. history, once said, "War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula."¹ While his style and conduct has been the subject of great debate for more than sixty years, George S. Patton, Jr. certainly inspired soldiers to accomplish monumental tasks during his service as an Army leader.

Background

The United States Army has a long history of heroic leadership, yet today's Army leaders are seemingly enamored with studies of business formulas, strategy, management, and efficiency. Rather than being captivated by the study of the leadership examples, dashing exploits, and prowess of great warriors of our own Army's past, officers in today's force are encouraged to learn techniques in organizational management and team-building from the task-masters of industry and corporate America. While reductions in both force structure and budget, as well as changes in focus and philosophy, have led to altered leadership doctrine, we must still strive to recruit, train and develop those officers with the dynamic qualities necessary to continue to inspire our soldiers to do great things.

One Company Commander addressed this point quite directly in a recent on-line discussion when he wrote quite candidly, "Managers don't ask people to kill or die...leaders do!"² Those who characterize themselves as this generation's Army leaders must take such comments to heart and endeavor to return to the leadership principles which will inspire that young warrior captain to continue the fight, continue his service, and replace us on the Army rolls in the future.

Most of us entering the senior ranks of the Army today grew up hearing stories or watching Hollywood productions filled with larger-than-life figures who led the Army of their country to great battlefield victories against great odds. Many of our greatest American military leaders first tested their own leadership during the Great War and honed their skills in the inter-war years. They then came to prominence on the far-flung battlefields of World War II, and they inspired succeeding generations of young Americans with stories of their combat victories and through the power of their charisma. These “Great Captains” of the American Army led our service through a global conflict, helped guide the next generation through major changes in the world, and set examples of leadership that bear continued analysis and emulation today. Yet it seems we have lost our affinity for these great leaders and have found ourselves reaching for lessons of leadership assembled by America’s academic community or derived from techniques in common use by successful corporations. So what is leadership and how should the Army proceed to make sure we are preparing the next generation of officers to lead us through a period of history that will continue to challenge our ground forces?

What is Leadership?

The U.S. military is passionate about clarity and using terms accurately; therefore we need to have an elementary understanding of leadership as both a word and a concept. In fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) exhausted nearly 700 pages of text in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, to further inform service members about the proper use of terminology in the context of the military profession. The authors noted in the preface to this comprehensive work that the purpose was to supplement “...standard English-language

dictionaries with standard terminology for military and associated use.” Additionally, the Director of the Joint Staff, the signatory official for the dictionary, directed the publication’s, “...mandatory use...” for the entire Department. However, the officer endeavoring to better understand one of the fundamental pillars of the military profession will quickly note the absence of the term, “leadership,” although a search of the DoD’s online version of the resource will yield a list containing derivatives of the word “lead” five times. Similarly, you will not find the term “management” defined in the pages of the publication, yet it appears in the data search more than 250 times.³

The *American Heritage Dictionary* offers perhaps the most basic definition of leadership as, “The capacity or ability to lead.” The same source defines management in terms of, “supervising, or controlling.”⁴ Therefore, very subtly, we can begin to understand that there are differences in the terminology associated with the role of an Army officer. While those in management positions are expected to exert a form of control over their employees, processes, and production, leaders are expected to possess a personal capacity that compels others to follow them. Thus defined, you would expect managers to operate within the confines of definitive rules, equations, and functions. However, leaders are expected to possess a less-clearly defined element of character and charisma. Instead of exerting certain pressures on a process to yield results, the leader is expected to inspire others, particularly Soldiers, to follow.

So, why are such important terms as leadership and management conspicuously absent from the Department of Defense Dictionary? I would offer the following possibilities: 1) The Army covers “Leadership” in sufficient detail in the 25 pages of Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership*⁵ and further examines the principles in

Field Manual 6 -22, *Army Leadership, Competent, Confident, Agile*;⁶ 2) The authors of military doctrine and publications have so intertwined the terms “leadership” and “management” that they can no longer be distinguished from one another; or 3) We have departed so far from the principals of military leadership that stood so long as the foundation of our military institutions, that we are no longer able to properly agree on an acceptable definition for a joint service document.

I would submit that the truth of the debate lies somewhere in the midst of all of the possibilities offered above. Most importantly, Army leaders of today must return the focus of our accessions, training, and selections to those fundamental principles of leadership that emerged from our great heroes of World War II and have carried us through nearly 70 years of challenges since. We cannot become so focused on business and management doctrine and philosophy that we lose sight of the fact that the primary mission of the Army leadership remains the ability to inspire our young patriots to close with and destroy the enemies of the United States. As a note of clarification, the reader should understand that the focus of this work is leadership not the study of command. The differentiation lies in the fact that an Army officer exercises command as the legal or regulatory authority granted to him/her by law or regulation.⁷ Leadership however is an element of human character which is possessed by an individual.

The Army currently defines “Leadership” as a, “...process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”⁸ The Army further defines an “Army Leader” as “anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and

influences people to accomplish organizational goals..."⁹ More bluntly, in testimony to the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1940, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall characterized the leadership expectations of America's soldiers stating, "You have to inspire them when they are hungry and exhausted and desperately uncomfortable and in great danger; and only a man of positive characteristics of leadership, with the physical stamina that goes with it, can function under those conditions!"¹⁰ However, leaders seem to differ in the interpretation and application of those definitions today and there is great utility in reviewing our Army heritage from World War II to the present to better understand where our focus should be directed to improve Army leadership today and in the future.

Marshall Sets the Standard

To begin an analysis of Army leadership, one must first have an understanding of the environment which so profoundly shapes our Army. As the United States was poised for entry into WWII, the officer corps of our largest standing Army was taking shape. Built upon a cadre of professional officers, many of whom saw service in WWI, the Army officer corps would soon expand to ten times its pre-war size. As a result of this rapid growth in structure and manpower, the Army had the dual-edged challenge of both identifying potential leaders and then harnessing their natural talents and improving upon them. Officers who had endured the lean and difficult inter-war years and led the service through the Great Depression shouldered much of the burden of leading that effort. Many may see the challenges of our current combat operations and resource constraints as nearly insurmountable obstacles. Yet our predecessors clearly faced, and overcame, much greater challenges as they led an Army of 190,000 men through meteoric growth to a force of more than 6 million, fought a global conflict, and

returned home to lead the nation through its greatest military and economic advances in history.¹¹

At the pinnacle of Army Leadership during World War II, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall clearly set the mark for military leadership on a global scale. General Marshall is recognized as a premiere leader who achieved great success in his military career and continued on to international acclaim for his success in the public sector as both a Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense of the United States. Before leading the Army's expansion, General Marshall had a hand in shaping the Army leadership in the inter-war years.¹² General Marshall likely developed many of his own opinions of leadership during his time as a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute where Southern heroes of the American Civil War still served as instructors.¹³ He carried similar principles with him during his tenure as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning. While there, Marshall impressed upon his faculty and students a series of basic principles. Thus, as the Army started to expand, long-serving officers had a firmly established set of leadership principles to follow. New officers quickly became familiar with those same lessons through formalized instruction, interaction with other officers, and in both military doctrine and other informal written publications.¹⁴

The George C. Marshall Foundation outlines "Marshall's Leadership Principles" as "Candor, Commitment, Courage, Integrity, and Selflessness."¹⁵ However, General Marshall himself expressed it more succinctly when he prepared his address for the graduates of the first Officer Candidate School in September of 1941. He said that new officers required "...two fundamental qualifications – thorough professional knowledge

and a capacity for leadership.”¹⁶ Marshall believed that the Army’s training institutions could provide an underpinning of techniques and tactics, but he theorized that “courage and evident high purpose” were individual qualities that a candidate had to possess prior to selection.¹⁷ Those qualities that were at the foundation of leadership, he believed, were elemental to the man who would become an officer candidate either as a result of nature or upbringing.

In line with Marshall’s views, The Officer’s Guide of 1942 defined leadership as “the art of imposing one’s will upon others to command their respect, their confidence and their whole-hearted cooperation.”¹⁸ The authors of the guide also took a martial view of the leader as “one fitted by force of ideas, character, or genius, or by strength of will or administrative ability to arouse, incite, and direct men in conduct and achievement.”¹⁹ Given a quick study of these and a myriad of other contemporary works by the senior officers of World War II, today’s Army leader must appreciate the perspective of leadership as an element of one’s personal character. The formulators of Army officer selection criteria of the time were deliberately focused on commissioning individuals from all walks of life who naturally demonstrated such qualities. In fact, General Marshall, a product of the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the Virginia Military Institute, threatened to resign from service when Secretary of War Stimson offered his enthusiastic support to a program which appeared to serve little purpose other than the commissioning of the academic and financial elite of New York and New Jersey society.²⁰ Appalled by a program which seemingly placed prominent individuals in positions of relative safety during wartime, Marshall was determined not to place officers who had no demonstrated leadership capacity into a position to lead

American soldiers.²¹ The Chief of Staff believed strongly that academic study and business skills alone were not sufficient to define an individual as a military leader. Marshall stood his ground on the Army's fundamental philosophy of leadership, and the leaders of that world war guided American and allied forces to success around the world.

Marshall not only led the world's most powerful military force during a time of world-wide conflict, but he also succeeded in rebuilding a fragile peace as a diplomat following the war. Therefore, we can gain a profound fundamental understanding of leadership in that era by looking back on his leadership principles and philosophy.

Another great military leader of the time, General Maxwell Taylor was a man of very different character and background than General Marshall. Yet General Taylor also captured similar principles of leadership in an address to the senior class of West Point near the end of World War II. He informed the future Army lieutenants assembled, that leadership, "...requires the display of qualities of character which reflect inner strength and justify confidence in one's self...in modern war when the leader can place himself in front of his men and inspire them in action...Personal leadership...should be supplied by every commander."²²

Even as the Army entered post World War II restructuring and force reductions and entered into the early stages of the Cold War, Army leaders continued to retain confidence in their officer selection, training system and philosophies of leadership. Even as the Army was changing dramatically on the surface, FM 22 – 5, *Leadership, Courtesy, and Drill*, couched leadership in such basic terms as "the art of influencing

human behavior. The basic elements of military leadership are character, knowledge of men, and ability to instruct and lead others.”²³

The Many Theories of Leadership

As the Army struggled with leadership theories and principles, leadership theorists toiled to understand the basic dynamics of leadership. They ultimately categorized leadership using one of nine commonly accepted theories.²⁴ First, some scholars suggest leadership is a function of the “Great Man Theory” of leadership that contends that leaders are born rather than made, and that those great leaders will simply emerge at times of great need. Audie Murphy stands out as perhaps the best example of the “Great Man” explanation of leadership due to his rise from obscurity. A diminutive man, Sergeant Murphy seemed to possess a natural leadership which compelled him to succeed under the stresses of combat. With very little formal training, Murphy earned the Medal of Honor and rose to national prominence seemingly on the power of his natural traits and capacity for leadership.²⁵

Next, some contend that leadership is a product of coinciding traits which certain individuals inherit. Advocates of this “Trait Theory” base their conclusions on the study of genetics and inherited characteristics. Some such theorists have gone so far as to identify which specific traits and skills are particular to great leaders.²⁶

Another group of researchers and educators would point to the fourth theory of leadership and offer that the “Behavioral Theory” best describes the military methodology of teaching, coaching, and developing certain desired traits in order to produce successful leaders. Under another theory, “Participative Leadership”, some researchers theorize that true leadership lies in ones’ ability to collaborate and draw out the best ideas of the organization for the collective good of the unit.²⁷ A sixth theory

offered by psychologists and sociologists is “Situational Leadership.” Based on a body of work spanning more than fifty years, situational leaders are believed to react and make decisions based on a host of external influencing factors. Thus, the leader is more a product of external input than a singular driving influence of the unit.²⁸

“Contingency” theorists offered still another examination of leadership contending that leadership is greatly influenced by a complex interaction of character traits, skills and external and situational influencers. As a result, they contend, some will seem to exhibit great leadership at certain times only to fail given a different set of dimensions.²⁹ Some historians would cite this theory as exemplary of General George S. Patton. While General Patton proved himself time and again over a long and honorable career as a battlefield master, he also found himself struggling and disciplined when thrust into the public and political spotlight. While his candor and audacity earned him accolades on the battlefield, Patton found those same natural tendencies to be an impediment on the fields of international criticism.³⁰

Many theorists believe that military leadership falls clearly into the category of “Transactional Leadership”, since subordinates in the military might appear to cede their authority to their assigned leaders. In this transaction, the follower receives salary, awards and other benefits in exchange for obedience, thus empowering the leader. In a seeming reversal of the “transactional” style, some theorists today are espousing “Servant Leadership” where the organizational leadership surrender themselves to the good of the group to create trust and shared purpose with their subordinates.³¹

Finally, “Transformational” leaders offer vision and passion to the organizational members to achieve great things. Such leaders inspire by selling their vision to a small core group with an infectious energy that becomes pervasive throughout the unit.³²

Unfortunately, you can quickly find flaws with any of these theories as an independent school of thought as each seems to be lacking full appreciation of the true dynamics of leadership, especially in the military context. The scholars also failed to fully account for the dynamics of “followership” in these theories and such dynamics are incredibly important in the context of America’s volunteer force.

From the 1950s through the 1970s, the Army and its perception of leadership were stretched and manipulated as the service attempted to deal with the sociology of leading draftees in a world where the nature of future conflicts was not clearly defined. The Army struggled to maintain World War II era systems of leader recruitment and training through the Korean conflict and into Viet Nam. However, senior leaders were not able to quickly adapt to the changes in American society that were placing significant pressure on the services. The populace was far removed from the national mobilization of the World War, individuals were often more motivated toward financial opportunities in civilian life, and many were dissuaded from entering military service due to a passionate national fervor against our involvement in conflicts outside the confines of the United States. As a result, the Army was forced to abandon or change some of its screening processes for prospective officers. Instead of recruiting and commissioning the emerging talent of a much broader population of candidates of a war-time force, programs instead began to focus on the mathematics of filling officer requirements. A signal of caution was sounded regarding this methodology by none

other than the national leader who had instituted the all volunteer force. President Richard Nixon felt that “the volunteer Army has failed to provide enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly sophisticated armaments.”³³

Leadership and Management Intertwined

As the Army overcame the military and psychological losses incurred by Viet Nam, military leaders entered the 1980s determined to reestablish the values and honor of national service. President Ronald Reagan, a World War II veteran himself, was also determined to reestablish a sense of pride and nationalism focused on the ultimate dismantling of the Soviet empire and the triumph of the United States in the Cold War. With sweeping developments in military technology, the Army was forced to develop leaders who were still well founded in the leadership character of old but also more astute in technical fields. Additionally, Army leaders would have to be competent in corporate and business skills to ensure the proper integration of advanced technology from conceptualization, through development, and into use and employment.³⁴ As such business relationships continued become common throughout the services, the Army found it logical to make linkages with some of the sociology and philosophies driving corporate America. Another significant leader of the Second World War, General Omar Bradley, touched on links between Army and corporate leadership in an article in *Parameters* in 1981. General Bradley wrote that “in selecting a company in which to invest our savings, we often give primary consideration to the company with good leadership...The one who commands – be he a military officer or captain of industry – must project power....”³⁵ Bradley, the “Soldier’s General” also makes other references to corporate leadership in his article which, on the surface, seem to clarify and strengthen the argument that the Army and American business are synonymous from a

leadership perspective. However, Bradley lends caution to his work by pointing out “...we use computers to obtain certain kinds of answers, let us not try to fight a whole war or even a single battle without giving proper consideration to the element of leadership.”³⁶ He further clarified that while business management strategies were useful in managing the rapid technological advances of the modern force, Army leaders could not lose sight of many of the intangible factors that their business counterparts might disregard.³⁷ The former Army Chief of Staff, and first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was convinced that technological development and sociology were driving changes in leadership and training methodology. However, with nearly seventy years of public service, General Bradley added “I don’t think a man’s character ever changes...I suppose we are born with a certain amount of leadership...(and) that leadership can be developed and improved by study and training.”³⁸

Perhaps looking to capitalize on the broadening leadership and management market, some of those engaged in corporate development efforts and management training and methodology began to include military leadership in their portfolios. But, even then, as the Army was beginning a massive reduction in manpower and resourcing, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell cautioned, “...leadership is the art of accomplishing more than science and management says is possible.”³⁹

Gaining momentum in the mid-1990s, experts in business management and corporate leadership became firmly entrenched in the military market using a liberal mix of corporate analysis and military studies to formulate their theories and philosophies for success and profit. In one such work, published in 1996, the author boldly asserts in his title that there is “A New Paradigm of Leadership” for the Army. Dr. Bernard M. Bass

included a wealth of data from a variety of private and defense research outlets to assemble his theories about the emergence of transactional and transformational leadership in the Army, using broad theories of leadership addressed earlier in this analysis. He attributed much of the change in leadership paradigms to fundamental changes in American society including motivation and purpose, attitudes, and professionalism.⁴⁰ Based on such academic works, many Army leaders continued to embrace and expand the lessons of management and productivity that were the foundation of U.S. commercial industry.

Attempting to determine when our Army Leadership philosophy and doctrine took a determined change of course is a difficult endeavor; however one can trace some significant activity in this area to the mid-1990s. While Army leaders were being directed to contemplate the deep meaning of business and corporate philosophies and reviewing management techniques, the Army continued to go through changes in our leadership and organizational structure. The Army senior leadership apparently felt it necessary to adopt some business management, efficiency, and team-building techniques and strategies to compensate for the challenges of maintaining an effective force at a time when the Army was subjected to nearly a thirty percent structure reduction.

With the perspective of time, however, we can see that some of the business doctrine that captivated military leaders, either out of necessity or choice, and continues to pervade our leadership training today, may have been off base. Notwithstanding the recent fiscal woes of the world's largest corporations, other researchers have produced volumes of work from the Army's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that seem to

challenge assertions about America's changing society that were, at that time, the underpinning of assertions that our leadership philosophies needed to change. Analysts cited the lack of "clear purpose to achieve total victory...increased questioning of the values of honor, duty, and country" and service in the Army as a "career itself, or a stepping stone to a civilian career" as reasons why leadership at all levels needed to change.⁴¹

Trends Emerging in Today's Conflicts

Yet, just seven years later, researchers found compelling evidence that suggests those earlier analytical efforts had missed the mark. In their 2003 work, authors from the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) concluded that the soldiers on the far-flung battlefields of today, "much like soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and well in today's Army."⁴² Perhaps even more definitive from the standpoint of leadership philosophy, Dr. Leonard Wong and other members of the SSI team also noted "that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation."⁴³ The same group of researchers concluded that our soldiers also fight, "because of the bonds of trust established with the Army as an institution. Our soldiers are professionals..."⁴⁴ As such, Army leaders owe it to those professional soldiers to adhere to the leadership principles that have not only made our formations successful in the prosecution of our mission but also those that make us unique as an institution.

If the conclusions of this more recent study are accurate, which seems to be the case from many sources and other similar studies, then the Army's leadership must refocus its leadership efforts to reflect the model of our forebears. Likewise, we should carefully analyze the leadership training tools we are using in our institutions, relegating

the studies of management and corporate productivity to those very few organizations that execute highly technical acquisition, production, and profit yielding endeavors.

Cultivating Tomorrow's Leaders

Some might argue that a dramatic change in leadership selection and training is an unsupportable endeavor. However, the Army has adapted to changes in accessions demographics to once again leverage the Officer Candidate School (OCS) system to fill Army leadership requirements. As they have over and over again in times past, the Army institutional system has responded to a need to train and supply the force with capable leaders. Leaders commissioned from the OCS process perhaps best represent those attributes and points of character outlined by General Marshall, because they are chosen from amongst their peers in a competitive and selective process to serve in leadership positions.

Other pundits to whom I have spoken regarding leadership training also contend that there is an insufficient body of work regarding leadership and success in the military setting to adequately advance such concepts in our training institutions. However, military historians could quickly offer resources to fill any perceived voids in academic material to adequately teach lessons of proven combat leadership. Instead of volumes of material relating methods for organizational dynamics and profit yield from the Fortune 500, students can become reacquainted with the heroic leaders from our collective service history. Simple business management philosophies are not acceptable, since the currency of our transactions is the lives of those young Americans for whom we are responsible. Army institutions have a host of long-enduring leadership material available for study and reference, and new authors have filled the market with

appropriate material over the past decade spanning every American conflict from the Revolution to current actions in the Middle East.

The Army still defines leadership in simple terms as the ability to influence others. Yet a quick review of the suggested reading list on the web site of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) offers little in the way of distinct Army leadership models and examples. Apart from the Center's own leadership handbook, CAL presents the student of leadership with a run-down of reference material on corporate models, management, and productivity on their home page.⁴⁵ The center offers a wide variety of doctrine and references within its online content, but the Army's leadership experts present a very corporate-oriented face to the world. CAL should turn its focus back to the multitude of past and current works of military relevance to give our Army's leaders a renewed historical perspective on our service's great leaders. Our military educational institutions should renew the call for written works that delve into the difficult matter of military leadership as a discrete art. They should, likewise, abandon the ongoing attempt to develop linkages with our civilian corporate counterparts for the apparent purpose of increased productivity.

Many former leaders, common Soldiers, and historians have added considerable works of substance to the market on the heels of the renewed fervor for stories of leadership, character, and values spurred perhaps by cinematic works of the past ten years like "Saving Private Ryan", "Band of Brothers", and "We Were Soldiers". Additionally, America's booksellers are making new contemporary accounts of combat and leadership in the Middle East available on a regular basis. So the Army's

institutions and training base have a wide variety of sources from which to choose in the ongoing exploration of the foundations of leadership.

As author and historian James L. Stokesbury noted in his work entitled, *Leadership as an Art*, the thing that continues to separate the Army leader from the corporate manager and the Soldier from the factory worker is a level of commitment which demands a different form of leadership. Stokesbury wrote, “The man who raises his right hand and dons a uniform is saying, in so many words, ‘I shall perform a certain task, and if necessary I shall put my life on the line to succeed in it.’”⁴⁶ He makes the point that such a level of passion and dedication is only found in the duty bound servant of the nation. Mr. Stokesbury adds, “these are the things that are not susceptible to computer analysis, these are what makes war an art, and therefore leadership an art as well.”⁴⁷

Similarly, retired general, and former Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan is very outspoken in his concern that today’s force is focused too much on management. In recent articles and speeches, General Sullivan reiterates the message he delivered at Fort Leavenworth two years ago when he stated, “Managing processes are not going to get you to the future. Leadership gets you to the future...telling somebody what you want to do and moving out, not managing processes.”⁴⁸

Conclusion

As we are poised to reach a resolution of our current engagements in the Middle East and continue to grope with the emerging missions around the globe, the Army must return to its heritage for examples of leadership to help give us guidance and waypoints on the journey into the future. Army leadership cannot place so high a value on

the lessons of corporate and business models that they lose sight of the intangibles that make our profession unique.

Those civilian and military leaders at the highest level of our force must understand that the restrictive implications of business management processes seem to run counter to the design methodology currently replacing traditional military decision-making and planning processes. Leaders and commanders have much greater latitude under the design concept to exercise their experience and judgment, even when their “gut” tells them to follow a course which seems to run counter to established processes and formulas.⁴⁹

A comprehensive leadership review should be undertaken in conjunction with the ongoing analysis of the Army as a profession to ensure that our recruiting, training, and promotion of leaders is in concert with that of our noncommissioned officers and Soldiers. We owe it to the Army to honor our institutional heritage, learn from those great men and women who preceded us, and continue to inspire others with our example of leadership. While we harness techniques from industry to get the most out of our resources, we also need to return our leadership values and principles to prominence in order to educate and inspire the next generation of Soldiers and the citizens of our nation.

Endnotes

¹ Office of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 10, 2011).

² Mary Blake French, ed., “Do We Need Leaders or Managers?,” *Army*, January 2011, 59.

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